The success of the Indian software industry is now internationally recognized.
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I. Introduction
Bangalore is a mid-sized Indian city in the southern state of Karnataka once known for its quaint houses with gingerbread trim, many parks, defense personnel, and pensioners. Today it is India's Silicon Valley. Multinational information technology (IT) businesses are flocking in to outsource IT services from their subsidiaries and from Indian subcontractors. Some are also establishing R&D centers. Bangalore is also host to numerous universities, management and public policy institutes, engineering colleges, and several government research institutes in aero space research, electronics, and communications. It draws the cream of the country's technical talent as well. This clustering of high-tech economic and knowledge-based educational activities intuitively suggests a thick institutional architecture.
Several factors explain the rise of the Indian IT industry: the country's long-standing emphasis on technical education, fortuitous global demand in the 1980s, the successes of local and expatriate Indian techno-entrepreneurs, dense social networks among professionals, Indian economic policy reforms, multinational investments, and state support for software exports (Arora et al. 2001 , D'Costa 2004a , D'Costa 2003a , Kattuman and Iyer 2001 , Patibandla and Petersen 2002 , Heeks 1996 . Among these factors the role of human capital -and thus universities -is given a prominent place. It is clear that universities are directly responding to the growing demand for software professionals by increasing enrolment capacity. By extension, this implies that strong universityindustry linkages (UILs) must be in the making in Bangalore if rising productivity (revenues per employee) can be shown (Okada 2004: 291; Athreye 2005) . After all, value addition based on deepening skills suggest innovativeness and cutting-edge technologies. And given that there is scattered evidence of foreign investments in research and development (R&D) , other than R&D and increased collaboration between universities and industry, what else could lead to such knowledgeintensive output (see Tsai 2005 , Audirac 2003 , Doloreux 2002 Contrary to expectations, I argue that Bangalore's development is predicated on a business model which does not encourage UILs. Though there is collective efficiency due to the spatial concentration of several hundred IT businesses in a milieu of numerous engineering and science 2 colleges and high-end public sector research institutes, most firms do not collaborate with other competing businesses or partner with academia or government institutions. The supposed thick institutional architecture in reality is thin. As one study characterizes India, the "gulf...between the academic world and industry" is significant (Dahlman and Utz 2005: 91 ). Bangalore's dynamism stems from linear and extensive growth rather than non-linear and intensive growth (D'Costa 2002a) . This is a result of an export-oriented model based on off-shore development of software services, targeted mainly to the US. Indian firms are well-positioned to take on large and small high-volume, low-value projects for foreign markets due to the availability of a relatively homogenized IT work force (Kambhampati 2002: 27, Parthsarathi and Joseph 2004: 100-104 ).
Firms face low entry barriers and the IT industry is structurally locked into a model of mostly small, undifferentiated firms. The ensuing "excessive" competition, though healthy for dynamic change, in the absence of deeper local institutional and intersectoral linkages discourages inter-firm cooperation, encourages high labor turnover, and contributes to a local wage-cost spiral. Hence, the sustainability of the extensive model could be at stake if competitiveness shifts toward East and Central Europe and East and South East Asia or if Indian firms continue to serve foreign markets in an enclave fashion (D'Costa 2006 (D'Costa , 2002b .
There are strategic options. To break out of the extensive growth trajectory, non-routine knowledge-intensive endeavors are necessary (Looy, Debackere, and Andries 2003: 225; OECD 2001: 7) by way of cross-fertilization of new ideas and new modes of institutional interaction between industry, academia, and government, known as the triple-helix model (Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005; Baber 2001; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Leydesdorff 2000 , Hayashi 2003 .
With rising costs, Indian firms could be compelled to move up the value chain by innovating, nurturing highly skilled talent, and establishing strategic UILs. Universities will then have to become "entrepreneurial," meaning, in addition to supporting firms and governments, they are expected to be "source of firm formation and regional development" (Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005: 245) . But that would call for an institutional make-over, akin to the triple-helix model. Currently this is a tall order for Bangalore as there is neither a working triple-helix model nor are there signs of one forming in the near term. The other option would be to continue with the extensive model, that 3 is, growth would be based on a few highly innovative firms with the remaining large and small firms engaged in relatively routine IT services. This option is dependent on the growing supply of IT workers and demand for such services. A third option lies somewhere in between, forging some strategic partnerships with universities (see Basant) , diversifying product and geographic markets, and overhauling the university curriculum to take advantage of both imminent labor shortages and new technological opportunities in the global economy (D'Costa 2004c).
The next section briefly presents the sources of Bangalore's growth by reviewing the supply of technical talent and the characteristics of external market demand. Section three presents some of the shortcomings of the extensive model in operation by examining the structure of the industry, the impact of excessive competition, and learning constraints. I conclude that the incentives to set up major UILs do not exist at this time. However, as section four outlines some intermediate steps to go beyond intensive growth, it shows that such measures may incrementally call for the establishment of UILs. These steps include a greater focus on the domestic market, the diversification of export markets toward East Asia, anticipating new technological trajectories, and retaining and attracting expatriate talent.
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II. Some Sources of Bangalore's Extensive Growth
Human Capital and the Supply Side
Extensive growth of Bangalore has created an expanding cluster of IT firms, engineering and science colleges such as the Indian Institute of Science, IT training centers, government high technology entities such as the Indian Air Force headquarters, Indian Space Research organizations, and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, and state-sponsored critical infrastructure such as satellite links in centrally organized software parks (see Heitzman 2004: 222-229, Taebe n.d.) . However, the mere concentration of public-sector academic and research institutions is not a sign of UILs since the earlier model of top-down state-dominated academic and industrial agenda in a semi-closed, security-conscious economy has not been completely shed (Sridharan 2004 (Sridharan , 1995 given the Indian IT industry a foothold in export markets, generated a brand name, and established professional networks, it has also induced the local university system to be content with replenishing the outflows of students without much regard to enhancing post-graduate training in core engineering fields. concern including more student exposure to project, skill sets identification, curriculum standardization, and so on (NASSCOM 2005) . Without such efforts it will be an uphill task for the Indian education system to obtain necessary international certifications and accreditations (NASSCOM 2005) . 10 9 Incidentally, Taiwanese firms are not known for new products, rather they innovate products developed elsewhere and in which markets are well-established (Breznitz 2005: 157) , that is, they "leverage" existing knowledge (Mathews and Cho 2000) . Taiwan has an excellent hardware sector, which is effectively driving the weaker software sector. It does little research but a lot of design (Lu and Liu 2004: 460) . Between 1991 and 2002, the number of IC design companies increased from 57 to 225 (Breznitz 2005: 161) . But even Taiwan seems to lack meaningful universityindustry linkages. 9
Exports and the Demand Side
Bangalore's extensive growth is also reinforced by the particular business model adopted by the Indian IT industry. Its principal characteristic is outward orientation based on off-shore development for exports with a focus on software services and heavy dependence on the US market (nearly 65%). There are nearly 100 multinational firms in Karnataka state, most of which are in Bangalore (http://www.bangaloreit.com 2005). Roughly 24% of India's top software firms are located in Bangalore, of which over 63% were multinationals (Okada 2004: 286) . In 2002, of 102
Bangalore-based NASSCOM members, close to 40% of firms had 100% exports, while 67% of the firms had export ratios over 80% (NASSCOM 2002b) . Over 80% of the firms had export ratios exceeding 60%.
According to one estimate (Table 2 ), India's strength is in customized software, with about 25% of the global market. However, this segment itself is estimated to be less than 4% of the global IT market. In other segments, where India's prospects are considered to be high do not require advanced skills except for network infrastructure management and packaged software. In fact, processing services and information services outsourcing are consistent with India's relatively abundant supply of English-speaking graduates, which is reflected in the growth in IT Enabled Services (ITES), commonly referred to as call centers and Business Process Operations (BPOs).
The growth of the ITES sector is a welcome development for a labor-abundant Indian economy. But this is not a sector that can boast of being at the cutting edge of technology. The role of universities is limited for this sector as IT training institutes are likely to impart basic technical training to English-speaking graduates. Firms will remain responsible for job-specific training.
Thus far the low cost of labor relative to OECD norms makes ITES outsourcing to India attractive (Hoffman 2003) , especially when competition under recessionary conditions in OECD countries compels cost cutting. The wage arbitrage in this sector is high enough to reinforce extensive growth of the Indian IT industry.
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III. The Pitfalls of Sustained Extensive Growth
One of the central sources for industrial development and innovative capability is the embeddedness of firms in the local production system (Parthasarathy 2004 , Hsu 2004 ). According to UNCTAD (2004: 151) , "high-skill services," among other things, "require advanced skills at high levels of specialization, often with strong educational institutions. They involve agglomeration economies, with different skills, enterprises and institutions interacting with each other to share work, stimulate knowledge flows, and allow specialized skills to be fully utilized" (author's emphasis). Bangalore appears to enjoy many of these characteristics. However, as it will be shown below, the particular business model adopted by the IT industry sustains extensive growth and thus discourages the kind of interactions necessary to be at the technological frontier. Related to this model is the significant influence of export markets. When foreign economies and firms are the principal clients and innovators, they influence what gets produced, how, and for which markets.
This is not intrinsically an unfavorable situation since diversified external market growth could translate into local technological learning opportunities. This is certainly evident in India. But institutionally, the tension between exogenous drivers such as export demand and technical talent and the endogenous "local production system" could undermine an "interlocking .. Similarly, labor mobility suggests competition among firms, skill upgrading, knowledge transfer, rising wages and thus innovation-led intensive growth. However, as it will be shown below 11 transitioning to intensive growth in IT without an explicit innovation policy incorporating UILs is daunting.
Fragmented Industry Structure
Unlike hardware manufacturing, the entry barriers in software services are low and competition among small firms in India is intense. While this does not necessarily lead to market inefficiencies arising from monopolistic practices (Khanna and Palepu 2004) , the proliferation of firms reinforces extensive growth based on low value-addition by an elastic supply of IT workers. 14 The top 20 Indian software exporters still account for about 60% of total exports, leaving more than 800 firms with the remaining 40% of the software market (Data Quest, various issues). The top 10 firms based in Bangalore contribute more than 50% of Bangalore's exports (Okada 2004: 286) . In theory, size per se is not important since most software projects tend to be small and thus well suited for entrepreneurial initiatives. In practice, however, large firms are able to carry out multiple projects simultaneously and thus not only spread risks across projects and markets but also carry out large, complex projects by quickly mobilizing large numbers of professionals. Large enterprises, local or foreign, can exercise monopsonist clout relative to smaller firms, though they too could be subject to periodic shortages of specific skill sets. Even the Economist, favorably disposed toward India, reports a shortage of over 1 million "suitably qualified people" by 2010 (Economist 2005: 58). As we will see below extensive growth itself is reproduced in a systemic way.
The fragmentation of the industry suggests that irrespective of size most Indian companies pursue whatever projects they can secure and which maximize the absolute difference between costs and revenues. This generalist and undifferentiated nature of Indian firms suggests competition based on price (Arora et al. 2001) . Thus most improvements in productivity are typically passed on to the foreign (read US) clients (Arora and Athreye 2002: 255) . The implication of this is that innovative capability is likely to be confined to a few large firms and a handful of medium-sized highly entrepreneurial firms, resulting from founder's or team's particular technical strengths, professional networks, and first comer advantages. It also implies that the incentives to form creative UILs are not high at this stage of extensive growth. 13 In comparison software revenues per employee in 1995 were for Israel $100,000, Ireland $142,000, India $9,000, and the US $126,000 (Arora and Athreye 2002: 259) .
14 The correlation coefficient between number of software employees and revenues per employee at the firm level for 2002 for Bangalore's 102 firms is not significant at 0.297. 
Competition in Undifferentiated Software and Software-Enabled Services
One important consequence of a fragmented industry is cut-throat competition. There are costs and benefits to such competition. An excessively competitive environment distorts compensation rates, induces a high labor turnover, a real estate bubble, and stress in the urban industrial and physical infrastructure. These would not be much of an issue over the medium term if supply responses by the public and private sectors were speedy and flexible. However, the political economy of Indian development suggests that a variety of political and institutional factors slow responses. 15 Such competition also undermines inter-firm collaboration, which, by most cluster experience contributes to industrial dynamism. 16 This can be also inferred from the number of alliances between Indian and US firms, which exceed the number of alliances among Indian 14 companies (Basant 2003) . Intense competition is evident from the secrecy maintained by firms when discussing projects and clients (see Prabhu 1999: 504) . This has been true for small electronic and engineering firms in Bangalore as well, where mutual suspicion among entrepreneurs has overshadowed cooperative ventures (Holmström 1998: 225 central feature of the software cluster in Bangalore is that firms are not -to any significant degreelinked by input-output relations (Lema and Hesbjerg 2003: 142) . 17 For example, some large, successful Indian firms in the Japanese market went even to the extent of refusing to sell a successful product made by another Indian company in the Japanese market (Lema and Hesbjerg 2003: 140) .
Lack of trust is reinforced by the business model that facilitates the compartmentalization of off-shore development of software projects. This division of projects structurally inhibits inter-firm cooperation, constrains project capabilities, and restricts joint-coordination of activities (Lema and Hesbjerg 2003: 137-143) . For example, a foreign client may outsource two components of the same project from two Indian firms but the Indian firms operate completely independent of each other.
They do not know what the component is for, how it might integrate with other software components, and do not have the technological understanding of the larger project to which they are contributing. Of course this could be a strategy by the client to protect key technologies. However, the result is that the systems integrator, typically the client or a consultant, has the knowledge of diverse domains rather than the individual Indian component suppliers. This can act as a systemic barrier to moving up the value chain. So even if Indian firms have mastered the production of 15 components of complex software projects, they find moving to project architecture daunting. The lack of trust translates into a strategy of capturing whatever projects come by and a growth strategy based on employment growth and talent poaching (see Kumar and Joseph 2005: 100) .
The undifferentiated nature of most Indian software firms induces severe competition. 18 As a result there is high labor turnover with more than 20% labor turnover (Athreye 2005: 20- European nations, and the Philippines illustrates the predicaments of low-end service provision (Siliconindia.com 2005c) . The growth of the ITES sector in effect works against the anticipated inter-institutional architecture for high technology growth associated with an evolving triple helix system.
Other Challenges to Innovation
High turnover suggests inter-firm mobility of labor in an industrial cluster, leading to 
IV. Transitioning to Intensive Growth
21 This has been the strategy of Taiwanese IT firms outsourcing R&D services from China (Lu and Liu 2004: 460-462) . This is no different from the asymmetrical relationship between Silicon Valley and India, which entails "value chain modularity" (see Sturgeon 2003: 204) .
Given the structural constraints of the business model adopted by the Indian IT industry, the Rather than strictly argue in favor of fostering UILs, given the incentive structure of the current model of off-shore based software service exports to the US market, I suggest an intermediate set of approaches to support a potentially intensive form of growth. This involves reorienting the export business model by addressing the interrelated areas of domestic market needs, export market diversification, and expatriate talent. However, to adequately to meet these challenges the role of universities cannot be ignored since technical education, improving the research environment, and anticipating new technologies are integral to innovative capabilities.
Developing the Domestic Market
India is weak in product development. Low level IT diffusion constrains the development of local software products (Kambhampati 2002) . While costs for international marketing are prohibitive, software products for the home market can be used a stepping stone to sell abroad.
Several India-made products are available in banking, finance, and software tools. There is good potential for software products in vernacular languages as evidenced by HCL Infosytems' unicodecompatible PCs to support seven Indian languages. Another area of software use is explicitly for 20 development purposes for providing critical government services. Here again, India has a better record than most developing countries but India needs to bolster software use even more for wider impact (Kaushik 2006 , Thomas 2006 . Also, the recent efforts by Indian firms such as Encore
Software and the Indian Institute of Science have led to the development of an indigenous, low cost computer called "Simputer." Relying on the open source Linux operating system, the Simputer promises to be a good alternative to relatively expensive foreign products (Jayaraman 2002b :359, Personal Interview, Encore, Bangalore, February 2005 . Already the affordable Simputer is being marketed to other developing countries in Asia and Africa. Due to export controls, Indian research institutions have developed alternatives to supercomputers made by US firms. These are good examples of software and hardware application for low-income countries, complementing and diversifying export markets.
Diversifying Export Markets
The Indian IT industry depends heavily on the US. Consequently, some of the technologically more challenging markets are not served by Indian firms. Japan is a case in point.
NASSCOM estimates that of the nearly $10 billion software service exports by India in 2002-03 only 2% went to Japan, whereas nearly two-thirds went to the US (D'Costa 2004c: 17). Poorer regions of the world imported more software services from India than Japan. 22 Among all the regions Japan had the lowest dependency ratio, which suggests India's penetration of the Japanese market is extremely low. While there are institutional and business reasons for India's limited participation, the opportunities are immense in the Japanese market. 23 Japan is the second largest IT market and is known for design and embedded software, areas which the Indian industry is only 22 The relative dependency ratio, computed by taking the share of Indian exports to Japan (2%) and divided by the region's share in world IT services spending ($34.9 billion/$349.1 billion), was 0.2. 23 The highly competitive Japanese hardware producers have always bundled their software, hence the development of an independent software industry in Japan has been discouraged (Anchordoguy 2000) . However, this development also suggests that the Japanese are strong in hardware-intensive software development, which for technical reasons has its own entry barriers. 
Anticipating New Technologies and Markets
In the related area of market diversification, the direction of the Japanese IT market is These represent increasing specialization of knowledge, science intensity, and aggressive R&D efforts (MEXT 2004: 43-44 To tap Indian talent from abroad, even on a temporary basis, both professional opportunities and high quality urban amenities are necessary. India has to compete with rich countries to attract its own talent. Recently the UK government announced plans to retain Indians in the UK (Siliconconindia.com 2005d) . While matching US salaries in India would be difficult, a high investment environment consistent with high macroeconomic growth would be the necessary first step. Taiwanese engineers returned on a large scale only after two decades of significant growth and structural change (Saxenian 2004: 171 Kumar and Joseph 2005) . The Indian firm TCS intends to move from design to fabrication of semiconductor chips, which is novel since it has been usually the other way around, with software following hardware development (Kash, Augur, and Li 2004: 789, 795) . It is a welcome development, given India's lack of chip fabrication plants. But it is imperative to forge appropriate institutional links with universities and public research institutions since semiconductor production is complex and capital-intensive as the Japanese efforts indicate. Such manufacturing activities could be a harbinger of high-end research, which could retain and attract expatriate talent as well.
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The Taiwanese experience offers some lessons. Like their Indian counterparts, Taiwanese students went to the US to study engineering and sciences. Most stayed, but the rate of return increased from 11% in the 1970s to over 25% by the mid-1990s (Chang 1999: 82-83) . The government offered returning Taiwanese talent travel subsidies, job placement, opportunities for 26 There is some anecdotal evidence of engineering students trained in complex subjects being lured away by commercially-driven firms working on less challenging assignments (Personal Interview, Indian Space Research Organization, Bangalore, July 1998).
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year-long research jobs before permanent employment, appointments for expatriate professionals in research and academic institutions at attractive salaries, and housing and schooling facilities (Chang 1999: 70-75, Mathews and Cho 2000: 191-192 (Castells 2003: 269) .
Today the government subsidizes private investments through equity participation in high technology companies in the science park and more public-private partnerships for basic research on fundamental technologies, nanotechnology, and digital signal processing (Dicken 2003: 186, Mathews and Cho 2000: 194) .
V. Conclusion
Bangalore's evolution as a high-technology cluster is a mixed story. 27 Of course the physical quality of life in Bangalore must be improved drastically if it is to attract and retain talent. It took the author more than an hour travelling from the city center to Electronics City, which was 12 km away (Bangalore, February 2005) . Urban congestion, unreliable electric supply, pollution, ageing airport, and skyrocketing real estate prices are the norm (Fannin 2004 ).
Bangalore is a good illustration of a developing country's success story pushed by its history and local and national institutions. It is also a warning of the structural challenges faced in overcoming technological and market barriers in the world economy. Developing countries can learn a number of lessons from Bangalore's experience. First, in a knowledge-driven economy technical education in emerging industries is critical. Both public and private parties can be involved and collaboration between the industry and public educational institutions is important. Second, Bangalore's high growth illustrates a cumulative outcome of history, changing business strategies, and global (mainly US) demand. Third, rapid growth could lead to increased enrolments and lower quality of applied technical education and push some firms to upgrade their activities. Fourth, the retention and return of expatriate talent can assist in intensive growth. Small countries are likely to find this daunting unless offset by sustained high macroeconomic growth. India stands a good chance of creating the incentives for investments and the return of expatriates. The final lesson is that Bangalore offers a cautionary tale about rapid growth of a narrow sector that requires high skills, which might detract from more fundamental needs of development such as basic education, health, and infrastructure. The economic and social polarization resulting from Bangalore's growth may not be politically sustainable. A strategy of domestic inclusive development, combined with a long-term national innovation policy for sectoral upgrading and export market diversification, will go a long way toward ensuring Bangalore develops a dynamic competitive edge and does not become merely an appendage to Silicon Valley's appetite for low-cost services. 34.5 201 n/a n/a Source: Government of Karnataka in Okada (2004: 299) .
n/a = not available 
